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ABSTRACT: In 2015, Johnson-
Laird, Khemlani, and Goodwin 
indicated four reasons why a ba-
sically syntactic approach ex-
plaining the human inferential 
activity is hard to accept no-
wadays. However, in this paper, 
I try to show that such reasons 
do not reveal real problems for 
the syntactic frameworks, and 
that most of the difficulties rela-
ted to them have already been 
addressed by the literature on 
cognitive science and conside-
red to be clearly surmountable 
from a mainly formal perspec-
tive. In this way, I argue that it 
is still possible to claim that 
syntax plays an important role 
in human thought.  
 
RESUMEN: En 2015, Johnson-
Laird, Khemlani y Goodwin plantea-
ron cuatro razones por las que, en 
nuestros días, es complejo aceptar 
un enfoque básicamente sintáctico 
para explicar la actividad inferencial 
humana. No obstante, en este tra-
bajo, intento mostrar que tales ra-
zones no revelan problemas reales 
en los marcos sintácticos y que la 
mayoría de las dificultades relacio-
nadas con ellas ya han sido analiza-
das en la literatura de la ciencia 
cognitiva y consideradas como cla-
ramente superables desde una 
perspectiva principalmente formal. 
De este modo, argumento que toda-
vía es posible defender que la sinta-
xis desempeña un rol importante en 
el pensamiento humano. 
 
RÉSUMÉ: En 2015, Johnson-
Laird, Khemlani et Goodwin ont 
indiqué quatre raisons pour les 
quelles une approche essentielle-
ment syntaxique expliquant l'acti-
vité inférentielle humaine est diffi-
cile à accepter de nos jours. Ce-
pendant, dans cet article, j'essaie 
de montrer que de telles raisons 
ne révèlent pas de problèmes réels 
pour les cadres syntaxiques et que 
la plupart des difficultés qui les 
concernent ont déjà été abordées 
dans la littérature sur les sciences 
cognitives et considérées comme 
clairement surmontables à partir 
d'une perspective essentiellement 
formelle. De cette façon, je 
soutiens qu'il est encore possible 
de prétendre que la syntaxe joue 
un rôle important dans la pensée 
humaine. 
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An essentially syntactic and formal theory is still possible 
 
MIGUEL LÓPEZ ASTORGA 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Several syntactic frameworks have been proposed in order to account for 
human linguistic activity and reasoning. Some examples in this regard can 
be approaches such as those of Beth and Piaget (1966), Henlé (1962), Mac-
namara (1986), Rips (1994), or, most recently, the mental logic theory (e.g., 
Bompastor Borges Dias & Roazzi, 2003; Braine & O’Brien, 1998a; Gouveia, 
Roazzi, O’Brien, Moutinho, & Bompastor Borges Dias, 2003; O’Brien, 2009, 
2014; O’Brien & Li, 2013; O’Brien & Manfrinati, 2010). While all of these 
proposals are not exactly identical and there are important elements that 
differentiate each of them from the other frameworks (e.g., the formal sche-
mata accepted in all of them are not always exactly the same), they seem to 
share a more or less direct relationship to natural deduction calculi akin to 
the one of Gentzen (1934, 1935) and based on the general lines of presenta-
tions of classical logic such as that of Deaño (1999). It is true that some of 
them, although they accept certain basic rules of standard propositional 
calculus, also explicitly reject certain relevant principles of this last system 
at the same time (e.g., as indicated below, the mental logic theory does not 
assume the material interpretation of the conditional). However, what is in-
teresting for this paper is that the idea of fundamental logical forms related 
between them appears to be essential in all of the mentioned approaches, to 
the extend that several of them have even spoken about a ‘syntax of thought’ 
precisely consisting of relationships between logical forms or formulae sim-
ilar (although, as said, not necessarily equal in all the cases) to those of 
classical logic (for example, the mental logic theory; see, e.g., Braine & 
O’Brien, 1998b). 
Nevertheless, the paper authored by Johnson-Laird, Khemlani, and 
Goodwin (2015) seems to question the primary ideas underlying these the-
ories. Indeed, they provide four reasons why frameworks of this kind cannot 
continue to be accepted (as also explained below, such reasons are that they 
cannot capture the everyday nonmonotonic inferences, that they usually 
understand the conditional as material, that they allow vapid inferences, 
and that they do not usually propose methods to identify the real logical 
forms of the sentences). In this way, my main goal here is to show that those 
reasons are not enough to undermine the formal or syntactic approaches. 
To do that, I will base on the literature on cognitive science and try to make 
it explicit that most of the possible problems that those reasons can cause 
to the formal proposals have already been dealt with in different works, 
which have given interesting responses and solutions to such problems. 
Thus, I will also argue that the option to support a syntactic approach still 
stands (regardless of the particular approach between those that have been 
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listed is assumed), and that hence it is also still possible to state that a 
syntax of thought exists (although that syntax is not necessarily the same 
as that raised by theories such as the one of the mental logic). 
Thus, this paper is divided in five sections. The first one explains the four 
problems pointed out by Johnson-Laird et al. (2015) and mentioned between 
brackets by me above. On the other hand, the remaining four address in 
turn each of those four difficulties and show the arguments that can be of-
fered to solve them. Hence I begin with a description of the problems. 
 
2. FOUR PROBLEMS FOR THE SYNTACTIC THEORIES 
 
The first problem indicated by Johnson-Laird et al. (2015) is that of mon-
otonicity. Certainly, standard logical systems and the syntactic theories di-
rectly or indirectly based on them tend to be monotonic, and this is a con-
cern because human thought does not seem to be so. Monotonicity means 
that, if a particular formula q can be derived from a premises set {P}, the 
addition of a new formula or premise to {P} does not affect to the fact that q 
can be inferred from it (see, e.g., Lukowski, 2013: 63-64). In other words, in 
classical logic, if it is correct that 
 
[I]: {P}  q (Where ‘’ expresses conditional relationship) 
 
It is also correct that 
 
[II]: {P}  r  q (Where ‘’ stands for conjunction and ‘r’ is any other formula) 
 
In this way, Johnson-Laird et al.’s (2015) complaint appears to be that, if 
this is so, formal logic cannot explain situations such as the following. 
Let us suppose that {P} refers to the fact that ‘you take a taxi’ and q rep-
resents the fact that ‘you will arrive earlier’. Thus, [I] would express 
 
[III]: If you take a taxi, then you will arrive earlier 
 
But let us also suppose that r means that ‘there is a traffic cut’. In this 
case, [II] would indicate that 
 
[IV]: If you take a taxi and there is a traffic cut, then you will arrive earlier 
 
So, the difficulty is evident. If our thought follows a conventional logical 
system, if we accepted [III], which is an action that seems reasonable to do, 
we would have to accept [IV] too, which is an action that seems unreasonable 
to do. True, taking a taxi can help to arrive earlier, but, if there is a traffic 
cut, taking a taxi may not be a good idea, since it can even cause one to 
arrive later. 
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Of course, one might argue that, while the human mind considers formal 
logic, syntax is not the only element playing a role in our reasoning. Indeed, 
formal approaches such as that of the mental logic theory claim that prag-
matics is important in thought as well, and that human beings make infer-
ences by taking into account not only the information explicitly stated, but 
also pragmatic premises included in their general knowledge (Braine & 
O’Brien, 1998b). In this regard, it could be said, for example, that people 
can accept [III] and, at the same time, reject [IV] because they know that 
traffic cuts cause people to be late, that is, because they know that r  ¬q 
(where ‘¬’ denotes negation). 
Nevertheless, following Johnson-Laird et al.’s (2015) arguments, this is 
not a solution for the problem. In calculi such as standard propositional 
calculus contradictions such as q  ¬q (to which we can easily come from 
[II], {P}, r, and r  ¬q) enable, via Ex Contradictione Quodlibet Sequitur prin-
ciple, to infer any formula from its denial, including of course, q. Although 
maybe it is almost trivial to present the following derivation, all of this can 
be very clearly seen by means of it. 
 
[1] {P}  r  q   (premise) 
[2] {P}    (premise) 
[3] r    (premise) 
[4] r  ¬q   (pragmatic premise) 
[5] {P}  r   (I 2,3) 
[6] q    (MPP 1, 5) 
[7] ¬q    (MPP 3, 4) 
[8] ¬q    (supposition) 
[9] q  ¬q   (I 6, 7) 
[10] q    (ECQ 8-9) 
 
Here, ‘I’ represents the conjunction introduction rule, that is, the rule 
that allows inferring a formula such as A  B from A and B. On the other 
hand, ‘MPP’ is Modus Ponendo Ponens, that is, the rule that can lead to B 
from formulae such as A  B and A. Finally, ‘ECQ’ stands for Ex Contradic-
tione Quodlibet Sequitur principle, that is, the principle that, as said, enables 
to derive any formula from its negation if a contradiction is discovered (in 
this case, the formula is q in [10], which is obtained after supposing its de-
nial in [8]). 
Accordingly, even assuming that people know, by virtue of their prag-
matic knowledge, that r  ¬q, as shown, it would also have to be admitted 
that, if our reasoning is related to logic, the acceptance of [III] implies the 
acceptance of [IV] too, since both of them allows inferring q if their anteced-
ents are true. 
Nonetheless, this is not the only difficulty that Johnson-Laird et al. (2015) 
observe in the formal frameworks. A second problem is that the conditional 
is interpreted materially in classical logic, and individuals do not seem to 
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understand it in that way. As it is well known, the material interpretation of 
the conditional provides that a conditional such as A  B is only false when 
these two conditions are fulfilled: (a) the antecedent (A) is true and (b) the 
consequent (B) is false. This appears to be obvious. However, it leads to un-
expected consequences as well. On the one hand, under this interpretation, 
whenever B is true (i.e., whenever (b) is not fulfilled), the entire conditional, 
that is, A  B, is also true, which means that, given B, A  B can be de-
duced, or, if preferred, that the prediction is that people will consider as 
correct inferences such as these ones: 
 
[V]: “He’s angry. 
Therefore, if she insulted him then he’s angry” (Johnson-Laird et al., 2015: 
202). 
 
[Vb]: She is happy. 
Therefore, if she passed her examination then she is happy. 
 
Nevertheless, the truth is that, as shown by the literature (see, for exam-
ple, as indicated by Johnson-Laird et al., 2015, Orenes & Johnson-Laird, 
2012), people do not generally accept this kind of inferences. In the same 
way, a similar difficulty can be noted in the case in which the antecedent (A) 
is false (that is, in the case in which (a) is not fulfilled). Certainly, if the 
material interpretation of the conditional is the correct one, a premise such 
as ¬A should also allow concluding A  B, that is, individuals should also 
judge as valid inferences such as those of these two examples: 
 
[VI]: “She didn’t insult him. 
Therefore, if she insulted him then he’s angry” (Johnson-Laird et al., 2015: 
202). 
 
[VIb]: She did not pass her examination. 
Therefore, if she passed her examination then she is happy. 
 
But the literature has already studied extensively this kind of inferences 
as well and shown that people often consider it as incorrect too (see again, 
for example, as also indicated by Johnson-Laird et al., 2015, Orenes & John-
son-Laird, 2012). So, this is clearly another problem needing to be solved if 
a formal logical theory is assumed. 
The third difficulty provided by Johnson-Laird et al. (2015) is even easier 
to understand. It is related to the ‘vapid’ deductions, which are “valid infer-
ences that yield useless conclusions, such as the conjunction of a premise 
with itself” (Johnson-Laird et al., 2015: 202). Undoubtedly, they are referring 
to the I rule in this quote, which enables, for instance, to derive A  A  A 
 A from A, that is, a conclusion absolutely valid but, as said by Johnson-
Laird and his colleagues, evidently vapid. Obviously, any syntactic theory 
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trying to explain human thought must account for why people tend not to 
deduce conclusions such as the aforementioned one, despite the usual nat-
ural deduction calculi allowing them. 
Finally, Johnson-Laird et al. (2015) insist in other problem already raised 
in papers such as that of Johnson-Laird (2010). That problem is the one of 
logical forms and has to do with the fact that the formal theories also need 
to explain how the logical forms of the expressions in natural language are 
recovered, since how the process could be is unclear. One might think that 
natural languages have certain words that lead to certain symbols. Thus, it 
can be thought that in English, for example, ‘and’ leads to  and ‘if… then…’ 
to . However, this is not really so because it is possible to find sentences 
with words such as those that cannot be linked to such symbols. Consider, 
for instance, these sentences: 
 
[VII]: “If oxygen is present then there may be a fire” (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 
2002: 663). 
 
[VIIb]: If he is European then he may be Italian. 
 
There is no doubt that, despite the fact that the sentences contain the 
words ‘if’ and ‘then’, they are not conditionals as understood traditionally in 
logic. Indeed, sentences of this kind, which is called ‘Enabling’ by Johnson-
Laird and Byrne (2002), are not false, as these last writers pointed out, when 
their antecedent is true and their consequent is false (oxygen without a fire 
is possible, as well as being European without being Italian), but only when 
their antecedent is false and their consequent is true (what really is not pos-
sible is that there is a fire without oxygen, or that he is Italian and not Eu-
ropean). Hence it can be stated that, if p refers to the fact that ‘there is 
oxygen’, or that ‘he is European’, and q to the fact that ‘there may be a fire’, 
or that ‘he is Italian’, the actual logical form of [VII], and of [VIIb], should not 
be p  q, but q  p. However, the way to note those associations cannot be 
merely syntactic. At least, other types of non-systematic processes are nec-
essary to discover them. Accordingly, this is a difficulty that makes it com-
plex to assume an essentially syntactic framework as well.  
These are the four basic problems that, according to Johnson-Laird et al. 
(2015), have the formal proposals. Nevertheless, as said, the literature offers 
arguments to overcome most of them and continue to think about a syntac-
tic approach. This is shown in the following sections, each of which ad-
dresses one of the four difficulties separately. So, the next section deals with 
the problem of monotonicity.  
 
3. MONOTONICITY AND FORMAL LOGIC 
 
The solution for the problem of the monotonicity in the syntactic theories 
is simple and has already been given by Lukowski (2013). Really, it is very 
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hard to find a situation of clear nonmonotonicity, and this is so because 
most of the situations that seem to be nonmonotonic are actually monotonic. 
In his paper, Lukowski (2013) reviews several types of apparently nonmon-
otonic inferences. However, as far as the sentences indicated above are con-
cerned (that is, the sentences [I] to [IV]), just an important argument pro-
vided by him can be enough. Lukowski (2013: 67-68) claims that, in many 
cases, a sentence such as [I] is only an abbreviated formula with implicit 
content that is not made explicit because it refers to a large number of ex-
ceptions that can avoid that the consequent happens. Such exceptions con-
stitute another set {S} including negated formulae that, if not denied, would 
block the derivation of the consequent via MPP. In this way, the really suit-
able form of [I] would be: 
 
[VIII]: {P}  {S}  q 
 
But this in turn means that what [III] really expresses is: 
 
[IX]: If you take a taxi and a, b, c,…, a traffic cut,…, and z do not happen, 
then you will arrive earlier 
 
As indicated, ‘a, b, c,…, a traffic cut,…, and z’ represent circumstances 
that can prevent the fact that ‘you will arrive earlier’ from happening, and, 
evidently, the fact that ‘there is a traffic cut’ (r) is included between them. 
Nonetheless, such circumstances are denied, which reveals that another 
form to express [VIII] can be as follows: 
 
[X]: {P}  ¬a  ¬b  ¬c … ¬r … ¬z  q 
 
Thus, if r were added as a premise, q could not be derived, since, in clas-
sical logic, the law of non-contradiction (¬(A  ¬A)) would make it impossible 
to have ¬r at the same time, and, therefore, to have all the elements that are 
present in the antecedent to apply MPP to the conditional and obtain q. 
Evidently, this account alone is already a powerful argument against 
Johnson-Laird et al.’s (2015) objection about monotonicity, as it reveals 
that, as indicated, cases of true nonmonotonicity are really difficult to en-
counter. However, even if this particular Lukowski’s (2013) explanation does 
not convince, we also have another possible account. That is the one of the 
mental logic theory. 
Following this last approach, although the human mind applies many 
syntactic rules akin to those of standard logic, it does not work by taking all 
the requirements of this last logic into account. In this way, one of the prin-
ciples of classical logic that this theory explicitly rejects is precisely that of 
Ex Contradictione Quodlibet Sequitur, since, under the framework of mental 
logic, contradictions only reveal a fact: some of the previous assumptions 
is/are false (e.g., Braine & O’Brien, 1998c). Thus, based on this proposal, it 
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can be said that a scenario with [I], {P}, and r, and in which it is known that 
r  ¬q, is not truly a problem. 
Certainly, given that, as mentioned above, pragmatic premises such as r 
 ¬q are possible in the mental logic theory, it could be expected in that 
scenario that the presence of {P} led to q, and the presence of r to ¬q (in both 
cases, via MPP, which would be applied to [I] and {P} to obtain q and to r and 
the pragmatic premise to obtain ¬q). However, this contradiction would only 
show, as said, that at least one of the premises is false. In this particular 
example, probably, the premise that would be rejected would be [I], the rea-
son of that being simply that {P} and r would be facts (that a taxi was taken 
and the traffic was cut would be two facts in the scenario), and, by coming 
from general knowledge, r  ¬q would be hard to reject. In this regard, it 
can be thought that the mental process would be akin to this one: prima 
facie it is assumed [I] and [III] because what is habitual is that, if a taxi is 
taken, one arrives earlier. Nonetheless, the presence of r reveals that it is 
not always so, as there are cases, for example, those of a traffic cut, in which, 
even taking a taxi, one might arrive later. So what actually happens is not 
that r blocks the derivation of q, but just that r shows that one of the prem-
ises is false ([I] or, if preferred, [III]). Hence, it seems that we are not really 
speaking about nonmonotonic inferences here, but only about inferences in 
which, in a particular time, a premise is removed because it is discovered 
that it is false. This action appears to be absolutely normal and usual in 
everyday human reasoning and, therefore, it does not have to be a difficulty 
for a syntactic theory. In fact, Lukowski (2013: 69-70) also seems to resort 
to arguments similar to these ones in his accounts on other types of infer-
ences that appear to be nonmonotonic too, and, however, they are not truly 
so either. 
Nonetheless, in any case, it can be said that the problem of the mono-
tonicity of the syntactic theories is not very serious. To solve that problem, 
we have not only one explanation, but, as shown, at least two. 
 
4. THE CONDITIONAL DOES NOT HAVE TO BE MATERIAL 
 
As far as the second objection raised by Johnson-Laird et al. (2015) is 
concerned, an obvious, rapid, and simple answer can be given: not all the 
formal theories interpret the conditional materially. The mental logic theory 
can be an example here again, since this framework clearly rejects that in-
terpretation for the conditional in several works (Braine & O’Brien, 1998c; 
O’Brien, 2014; O’Brien & Manfrinati, 2010...). Besides, there are even papers 
based on this theory trying to show that a sentence with the structure ‘if… 
then…’ can refer to different logical forms and pragmatic premises (e.g., 
López-Astorga, 2016). 
In this way, the problem of examples [VI] and [VIb] directly disappears, 
since, if the conditional is not material, it is not necessary to assume that A 
 B is true whenever ¬A is so. However, this does not also apply clearly in 
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the case of examples [V] and [Vb], which, even if the material interpretation 
is ignored, do continue to be apparently a problematic point in respect of 
the conditional. This is so merely because the conditional introduction rule, 
that is, the rule enabling to infer A  B from B after supposing A, is admitted 
by most of the syntactic theories, including, of course, the mental logic the-
ory (see, e.g., Braine & O’Brien, 1998d: 81), and, as said, it is not always 
considered as valid by people (Orenes & Johnson-Laird, 2012). Nevertheless, 
I think that a first important point that deserves to be mentioned in this 
regard is that, although, indeed, it is true that many syntactic theories ac-
cept the conditional introduction rule, it is also true that they often place 
restrictions and conditions for its use (for the particular case of the mental 
logic theory, see, e.g., Braine & O’Brien, 1998c). Thus, it is relevant to clarify 
that assuming a formal theory does not mean to claim that the conditional 
introduction rule is used by people whenever possible. 
In this connection, it can also be said that, while it must not be forgotten 
that all of the syntactic theories are not the same, maybe there is an account 
on the real circumstances in which the conditional introduction rule can be 
applied that could be accepted by most of them and that, therefore, is linked 
to the material interpretation in no way. The idea is that the rule is only 
used or judged as correct when the antecedent is actually necessary to ob-
tain the consequent, and it is not possible (because there is no enough in-
formation) to come to the consequent without the antecedent. Thus, the pre-
diction is that individuals will tend to reject inferences such as this one: 
 
[11] q    (premise) 
[12] p    (supposition) 
[13] q    (reiteration 1) 
[14] p  q   (I 2-3) 
 
(Where, obviously, ‘I’ stands for the conditional introduction rule) 
 
Likewise, the proposal implies that the contrary will happen in this case: 
 
[15] ¬(p  q)   (premise) 
[16] ¬r  q   (premise) 
[17] p    (supposition) 
[18] ¬r    (MPT 15, 17) 
[19] q    (MPP 16, 18) 
[20] p  q   (I 17-19) 
 
(Where ‘MPT’ refers to the version of the Modus Ponendo Tollens rule that 
allows deriving ¬B from ¬(A  B) and A) 
 
The predictions regarding these two inferences are not the same. In the 
deduction in steps [11] to [14], p is not truly necessary to derive q, which is 
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already present in [11]. Nonetheless, in the inference in steps [15] to [20], p 
is absolutely needed to do so, to the extent that it can even be thought that 
it is the cause of q, since this last formula cannot be concluded without it. 
Of course, under this proposal, it should be also admitted that there can be 
cases in which an inference such as that in steps [11] to [14] is accepted (for 
example, the content of both p and q can lead individuals to provide rela-
tionships between them by virtue of their general knowledge and, based on 
information not explicitly offered in the inference, to think that p is the cause 
of q). In the same way, it is possible that the acceptance of the inference in 
steps [15] to [20] is hard because of an eventual abstract content in p, q, 
and r as well. However, the proposal in general is that people will only admit 
and apply I when the antecedent is really necessary so that the consequent 
happens. 
But, in any case, what is most important about this account for this pa-
per is that it has several advantages: on the one hand, it is coherent with 
the main theses of different syntactic theories (e.g., as far as I understand 
them, it is clearly and obviously in the same direction as some theses of the 
mental logic theory in Braine & O’Brien, 1998c). Secondly, it can be checked 
by means of an empirical experiment (certainly, responses given by partici-
pants in tasks consisting in the two kinds of inferences indicated can be 
easily analyzed). Finally, what is truly relevant here: it explains the difficulty 
detected by Johnson-Laird et al. (2015) and indicates under what circum-
stances I can be considered as correct and in which situations it can be 
thought not to be valid. And all of this is so without necessarily accepting 
the material interpretation of the conditional (and hence removing, at the 
same time, the complains linked to [VI] and [VIb]). Accordingly, it seems that 
the inconveniences related to the problems of the conditional are not insur-
mountable for the formal theories either. 
 
5. VAPID CONCLUSIONS ARE NOT ACTUALLY POSSIBLE 
 
In fact, the problem of the vapid conclusions was solved a long time ago. 
The proponents of the mental logic theory introduced the concept of ‘Feeder 
Schemata’ (see, e.g., Braine & O’Brien, 1998d) to indicate that there are for-
mal rules that are only applied when necessary to continue an inference. In 
this way, if the use of the rule does not enable further inferential steps, it is 
not applied. Thus, the vapid conclusions are impossible.  
Evidently, the mental logic theory includes in this category rules such as 
I, which makes it possible to respond the Johnson-Laird et al.’s (2015) par-
ticular example in this regard, since, as just explained, from this framework, 
one cannot infer a formula such as A  A  A  A from A. Nonetheless, in my 
opinion, the possibilities that the concept of Feeder Schemata opens go 
much further than the use given to it in the mental logic theory. I think that 
a syntactic theory could also claim that all the difficulties linked to I can 
be removed if that concept is also applied to this last rule to some extent. 
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Obviously, I cannot be thought to be a simple Feeder Schema, as, if it 
were, that fact would imply that its conclusion (A  B) should be useful only 
to derive more information, and the truth is that such a conclusion can be 
interesting alone, whether or not it leads to further conclusions. However, it 
is indeed possible to introduce as a new concept that of the Feeder Suppo-
sition and to consider that the supposition in I (A) is a supposition of that 
kind, that is, a formula that can only be supposed if it actually serves to 
obtain at least a new datum (in this case, the consequent of the conditional, 
i.e., B).  
As it can be noticed, assuming this thesis would not be saying something 
substantially different from what has been argued in the previous section, 
since the idea would continue to be that I can only be used when the 
supposition of the antecedent (A) in the conditional of the conclusion (A  
B) truly leads to the consequent (B), and this last clause (B) cannot be in-
ferred by other means. But giving the supposition that has to be made in I 
the status of Feeder Supposition does make it explicit a point that only was 
implicit in the explanation above: the restriction placed to I prevents it 
from deducing vapid conclusions as well. Indeed, it is clear that A  B is 
not the only conclusion that can be derived from B. A formula such as, for 
example, A  {A  [A  (A  B)]} can also be inferred from B just using I 
four times. In this way, the restriction raised, which, as indicated, is not 
different from the idea of considering the supposition of the rule a Feeder 
Supposition, seems to be helpful to argue against two problems pointed out 
by Johnson-Laird et al. (2015): the one of the conditionals and the one of 
the vapid conclusions. 
Of course, a possible objection against the previous accounts can be that 
I and I are not the only rules that can cause vapid conclusions. Nonethe-
less, it is not hard to note that the concept of Feeder Schemata can be ap-
plied to any rule and that, therefore, it can be stated that the fact that the 
schemata can be considered as Feeder removes the objection related to the 
vapid conclusions.  
 
6. THERE IS A PROCEDURE TO IDENTIFY LOGICAL FORMS 
 
Really it is not unclear how logical forms are recovered from sentences in 
natural language. In, for instance, López-Astorga’s (2015), a way to detect 
them is proposed, and what is surprising is that this way is based on the 
general methodology of the semantic theory that Johnson-Laird et al. (2015) 
support as an alternative to the formal approaches: the mental models the-
ory (in addition to this last paper, see, e.g., Hinterecker, Knauff, & Johnson-
Laird, 2016; Johnson-Laird, 2012; Khemlani, Orenes, & Johnson-Laird, 
2014; Oakhill & Garnham, 1996; Ragni, Sonntag, & Johnson-Laird, 2016). 
Explaining the basic principles of this last theory is beyond the aims of this 
paper. In this regard, the only essential point of it that is relevant to the 
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present discussion is that it ignores logical forms and only takes into ac-
count the semantic and iconic representations corresponding to the possi-
bilities linked to sentences. This, for the case of a conditional such as A  
B means that what is important about it is not its syntactic structure, but 
the fact that it refers to these three possibilities: 
 
[XI]: A & B, ¬A & B, ¬A & ¬B (see, e.g., Johnson-Laird, 2012: 138) 
 
Because the mental models theory assigns [XI] to the conditional, prima 
facie it seems that the relation between this last theory and the truth tables 
of classical logic is very strong, since, as it can be noted, [XI] includes the 
three possibilities in which the conditional is true in accordance with the 
material interpretation, and hence excludes only the case in which the an-
tecedent is true and the consequent is false. However, this is not so for sev-
eral reasons. If the goals of this work are considered, the most important of 
them can be that the semantic content of the clauses and pragmatics can 
modify the possibilities. This phenomenon, which is called ‘modulation’ by 
the mental models theory (see, e.g., Johnson-Laird, 2012: 146), can be easily 
observed if we pay attention to an example such as [VII] again. If now A 
corresponds to the fact that ‘there is oxygen’ and B to the fact that ‘there 
may be a fire’, obviously, as it can be inferred from what has been said about 
this example and [VIIb] above, its possibilities are not those of [XI], but the 
following: 
 
[XII]: A & B, A & ¬B, ¬A & ¬B 
 
And its real logical form is not A  B, but B  A. 
 
But, following arguments such as, for example, those of López-Astorga 
(2015), the reason why we can notice that B  A is the suitable form for [VII] 
is not dark, but very clear. It is very easy to build a truth table showing the 
possibilities in [XII] as the cases in which the sentence is true and the miss-
ing possibility as the case in which the sentence is false. Thus, proceeding 
in a similar way as López-Astorga (2015: 146), the content of [XII] can be 
expressed as follows: 
 
 v(sentence) = 1 if one of these is the case: 
  -v(A) = 1 and v(B) = 1 
  -v(A) = 1 and v(B) = 0 
  -v(A) = 0 and v(B) = 0 
 
 And v(sentence) = 0 if this is the case: 
  -v(A) = 0 and v(B) = 1 
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 (Where ‘v()’ means ‘truth value of ’, ‘sentence’ refers to [VII], ‘1’ de-
notes truth and ‘0’ represents that the element between brackets is false) 
 
In this way, from this information, it is not hard to come to a well-formed 
formula in standard logic that is true in exactly the same cases as [VII]. That 
formula is, of course, B  A, as, obviously, v(A  B) = 1 in exactly the same 
combinations of the truth values of A and B in which v(sentence) = 1, and 
v(B  A) = 0 in precisely the same scenario in which v(sentence) = 0. 
So, undoubtedly, there is a procedure to recover the logical forms of sen-
tences. That procedure has already been used in different papers, for exam-
ple, as mentioned, the one of López-Astorga (2015: 146-147), in which the 
conditional is not the main connective analyzed, but disjunction. However, 
the most interesting point in this way can be that, given that the procedure 
is based on a methodology key for the theoretical approach held by Johnson-
Laird et al. (2015), if these last authors continue to affirm that the process 
of identification of logical forms is not clear, they will have to assume that 
their methodology of analysis of possibilities is not clear either. And the rea-
son of this seems to be obvious: according to arguments such as those of 
López-Astorga (2015: 146-147), the analysis of possibilities of the mental 
models theory may not be a procedure substantially different from that of 
the recovery of logical forms. 
 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
 
Therefore, it cannot be said that the factual communication shows that 
a formal perspective cannot be supported anymore. As argued in this paper, 
the main problems that can be raised against a syntactic framework can be 
easily responded, the basic ideas being that it is really difficult to think 
about a clear nonmonotonic inference, the material interpretation of the 
conditional is not the only possible interpretation, some formal rules are just 
Feeder Schemata, and the truth tables of classical logic reveal the actual 
logical forms of the sentences. 
Nevertheless, this does not mean that there are no other difficulties to 
face with regard to the formal theories. As said, there is not a single syntactic 
approach. We have a number of them, and, therefore, adopting a formal 
perspective may not be sufficient. Perhaps it is also necessary to make a 
decision on the particular framework to be assumed, since, for example, 
accepting the idea that a syntax of thought really exists does not have to 
imply admitting that that syntax is exactly as described by the mental logic 
theory. 
Furthermore, as also argued in papers such as that of López-Astorga 
(2015: 148), maybe the mistake is to deem pragmatics, semantics, and syn-
tax to be irreconcilable or incompatible perspectives. As pointed out along 
this paper, pragmatics is present both in a syntactic proposal such as that 
of the mental logic theory and in a semantic approach such as the one of 
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the mental models theory. In turn, the link between semantics and syntax 
can be found in the way that has been indicated to recover logical forms, 
that is, in the arguments presented in the last section. Studies such as the 
one of López-Astorga (2015) already developed that way, according to which 
the meaning of the semantic and pragmatic possibilities of the mental mod-
els theory can lead to formal structures or, if preferred, logical formulae, to 
which, secondly, the formal rules would be applied. Perhaps, as raised in 
this last paper too, that is the right course, a course in which, as in the real 
inferential activity and the actual natural languages, pragmatics, semantics, 
and syntax complement and support each other. 
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